While I look forward to the administration’s full explanation of the deal and its annexes, a number of observations are possible now. First, the outcome appears largely consistent with the
framework agreement announced April 2. The most important achievements of the framework remain intact: The number of centrifuges in operation must be reduced to
5,060 from the current 9,500; Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium must be cut from 10,000 kilograms to 300. The former must be observed for 10 years and the latter for 15. The extensive monitoring of the entire supply chain, from the mining and milling of uranium, to the conversion of yellowcake and the enrichment of uranium hexafluoride, or UF6, will continue for 25 years. The core of the heavy-water reactor at Arak must be removed and redesigned, and no reprocessing capabilities will be permitted. And the Iranians will be obligated to observe the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forever.
In practice, these limitations and the verification associated with them make it highly unlikely that the Iranians could divert materials for a covert program or would be in a position to break out to weapons-grade material in less than a year for the eight and a half to 10 years that the restrictions on the number and types of centrifuges apply